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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NORTH A:\IERICAN BUILDERS, t 
INC.. A ll t , ppc an , 
vs. 
UNEl\,IPLOYl\IEXT CO~IPENSA- /Case No. 
TION DIVISION DEPA HT- ) 
11277 
l\l E N 'l' OF El\IPLOYMENT 
SECCRITY, STATE OF CTAII, 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
ST ATE:\IENT OF CASE 
The Utah Department of Employment Security 
of the Industrial Commission of l Ttah on January 22, 
1968, acting under the provisions of Chapter 35-.J. CCA, 
i'lsued a review decision holding that certain installers 
of metal siding. doors, windows, and stone, etc., per-
formed serYices in employment for wa~es within the 
n1ea11ing of Sf'ction 3.3-±-:22 (j) ( 1) and ( .5) CCA. 
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A decision assessed unemployment compensation con-
tributions against the Appellant in the amount of 
$2,839.70 and interest thereon to the date of the deci-
sion in the amount of $175.54. The assessment was made 
on the basis of unreported subject wages in the amount 
of $126,510.23. The decision was affirmed on appeal 
by the Appeals Referee and by the Board of Review 
of the Industrial Commission of Utah. The matter is 
now before this Court on a petition for review. 
STATE~1ENT OF FACTS 
Orville Grossaint, Larry Grossaint, Don Grossaint, 
and Eldon ~Iecham filed claims for w1employment 
compensation benefits listing on their claim the North 
American Builders, Inc., as their employer during their 
"base period" which was the period commencing Octo-
ber 1, 1966 and ending September 30, 1967. 'Vage 
requests were sent to the North American Builders, 
Inc., the Appellant, and these were returned to the 
Department by the Appellant with the notation that 
the claimants were not in employment, but were sclf-
employed. The Department audited the Appellant's 
records and made the aforementioned assessment on the 
basis of the information obtained from its records. 
The Appellant, North American Builders, Inc., an 
employer subject to the payment of unemployment 
compensation contributions under the provisions of 
Chapter 35-..J. UCA beginning January 1, 1966, is a 
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corporation engaged primarily in the business of ware-
housing, selling, and installing metal siding, metal doors 
and windows, and other home improvements. The Ap-
pellant engages salesmen who solicit sales from home 
owners. The salesmen enter into contracts with the home 
owners on the Appellant's forms and in the name of 
the Appellant, and the contracts provide for the fur-
nishing and installation of materials. (TR-0014) (TR-
0022) ( TR-0026) . 
When a contract with a home owner is received 
from a salesman by the Appellant, the Appellant, if 
it approves the contract, arranges for financing usually 
through a bank or the FHA. Appellant then prepares 
a "work order" on its own form and proceeds to contact 
an installer who is a worker skilled in preparing the 
building and installing the steel or aluminum siding, 
windows, doors, etc. This contract with the installer 
is made either by telephone or at the time the installer 
comes to the Appellant's office to ask for a "work order." 
( TR-0014<) ( TR-00399). 
The installers (in almost all cases there are two 
nr more on each job) furnish a truck, hammers, saws, 
ladders, planks, scaffolds, cutters, etc. ( TR-0041). The 
Appellant fixes the piece-rate amount which the in-
staller is to be paid for the several types of materials 
to he installed. At the time covered by the assessment, 
the schedule of fees was as follows: Steel siding, $17.00 
rer square of 100 square feet for work done in Salt Lake 
and ~:2:2.00 per square for work done outside of the 
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Salt Lake area. (The piece rate for aluminum siuing 
was $2.00 less per square.) The piece rate for stripping 
was established by the Appellant at $5.00 per square 
and the piece rate for installing doors and windows was 
fixed by Appellant, subject in a few unusual cases to 
some negotiation with the installer. (TR-0038) (TR-
0039) . The installer might turn down a "work order" 
if he felt that it involved a job which was too small 
and too far away or if he was currently working in 
making installations for some other company. 
There are only about 15 crews of installers available 
to the industry in Utah and their names and abilities 
are known throughout the industry. As the president 
of the Appellant company testified ( TR-0018), "This 
is a trade all its own. I would say that it is a skill. You 
can't get anybody-you can't get a carpenter to do the 
same work. You are limited, in other words, to workers 
in this area" (meaning the area of siding and metal 
install a ti on) . 
'Vhen aluminum siding first came intc the area, 
a manufacturer sent an instructor into the area to teach 
its installation, but generally the installers haYe learned 
the trade from other installers. ( TR-0054). 
'Vhen the installers receiYe a "work order" at the 
office of the Appellant, they driYe their truck to the 
Appellant's warehouse. There, assisted by an employee 
of the Appellant, they load their trucks with the material 
specified by the Appellant. ( TR-004 I). (In most cases 
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this loading process takes about one-half hour.) If 
stripping is required on the job, (the .. c\..ppellant does 
not 'rnrehouse stripping) the installers drive to a lum-
ber yard, obtain the necessary stripping, and unless it 
is a small amount, the installers have it charged to the 
Appellant. ( TR-0041 j. If the amount of the stripping 
or other needed material is small, the installer will pay 
for the material and be reimbunied by the Appellant 
upon presentation of a bill. If the "work order" speci-
fies the installation of stone which is not warehoused 
by the Appellant, the installers obtain the stone from 
the premises of a supplier and charge it to the Appel-
lant. ( TR-0042) . If doors or windows are not standard 
the installer, when arriving at the job and taking the 
measurements, phones them in to the Appellant, who 
has them made. The installer will then pick up the doors 
or windows, as the case might be, and transports them 
to the job. ( TR-0057). The installers are supervised 
at the warehouse in the loading of the materials but 
on the job the work is done without any immediate 
supervision by the Appellant, although their work may 
he inspected by the salesman who sold the job. In cases 
where the installers obtain additional material because 
the original material given them was insufficient to 
cover the area involved, the salesman might remeasure 
the job to determine the total number of squares which 
were actually needed. 
If the installer travels to a job and the job has 
been cancelled for any reason he is, at times, compen-
~atecl for his lost time and expense on a basis which 
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is determined by the Appellant. ( TR-0057). In case 
there are unw>ed materials, the installers haul them in 
their truck back to the Appellant's warehouse where 
the installers unload them. ( TR-0057). 'Vhen a job 
is completed, the installers are paid when they return 
to the Appellant's office and present the "completed" 
"work order." ( TR-0023). At times the payment is 
made to one of the installers who, in turn, divides the 
payment with the other installers who worked with him. 
At times payments were made directly to the several 
installers by the Appellant. 
During the period of the assessment the Appellant 
did not deduct Social Security or withholding taxes but 
the Appellant did maintain 'V orkmen' s Compensation 
coverage on the installers. ( TR-0025). 
None of the installers whose wages were involved 
in the assessment had business cards, business tele-
phones, or offices. They did not advertise (any business 
of the same nature as they were invo!Yed herein). (TR-
0035). They obtained work by regularly contacting 
employers or by having employers call them at their 
homes. ( TR-0027) ( TR-0039) . The installers generally 
were engaged in performing services on the piece-rate 
basis for the several employers in the industry. During 
the assessment period, the Grossaints spent most of their 
time working for the Appellant. They testified thHt 
they did, as a matter of practice during the period 
in question, go to the Appellant's office each day when 
they were not working on a job, to wait for jobs to 
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come in. ( Tll-0055) ( TH-0056). Prior to the assess-
ment period the Grossaints had dissolved partnerslup 
whieh was formed for the purpose of obtaining a cou-
tractor' s license and were working as individuals on 
the piece-rate basis. Orville Grossaint testified as follows 
in explaining why he and his sons obtained the cou-
traetor' s license in the first instauee. ( TR-0048). 
"Let me explain it I thid( iL is important. In 
about April, 1965, we were approached by differ-
ent companies that we were going to be required 
to get a contractor's license in order to put this 
siding on, and we were interested in it so we 
went up and talked to l\Ir. Hendrickson at the 
contractor's board, and he explained just why 
he thought it was essential to get a contractor's 
license. So 1 think out of about 25 or 30 appli-
cators in Salt Lake City, there was one con-
tractor's license issued, and I think maybe two. 
And we went to, I think it was the First \Vest-
ern Construction with .Jack Lord, and we asked 
him-we found out what it would cost us, you 
know, to pick up a contractor's license and how 
we was going to get paid for having a contrac-
tor's license. 
"And at the time we figured it would cost us 
15 percent above the price of applicating at the 
time to take care of our book work and pay our 
tax, and what have you. And so we went to 
Layne Kimball and he said. 'Yes, if you will 
take care of your own book work, and pay your 
O"Wn tax, I will be willing to pay you 15 percent 
extra.' 
"And the same thing was said when we went 
to wnrk for :\Ir. Pavich. But there was only two 
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people that ever paid us that 1.5 percent, and 
that was Jack Lord and Layne Kimball of First 
lVestern Construction. But we carried , on for 
about six months when I found out-after we 
split up our partnership-the boys got the same 
wages per square that I did, the same dollars 
per square, the same amount of money I did 
and I think I did two or three jobs and got paid 
under the name of D.O.L. Construction Com-
pany, and I walked in the office one day and I 
got a check made to Orville Grossaint instead 
of D.0.L. Construction Company. Now I don't 
know why this was stopped, but it wasn't at my 
request. So I came up here aud withdrew my 
11umber up here and went everywhere else and 
took care of it. I went to an attorney. There were 
some papers drawn up at the tim~ and I think 
they have a copy of it." 
Donald Grossaint testified 011 the same subject. 
(TR-0053) . 
. Mr. Dremann: "Do you have a license at the 
present time, Donald? · 
D. Grossaint: "No. 
Mr. Dremann: "Did you ever make applica-
tion for a license~ 
D. Grossaint: "No. 
~lr. Dremanu: "Do rou recall the incident 
when the D.0.L. Construction Company was 
formed and the license was taken out? 
D. Gross:i.int: "Thev told us up at the Statr 
Contractor's Board tl;at all applicators in the 
future would be required to have a license to 
install siding. They told us that anvone who 
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wasn't was going to be liable to a fine and im-
prisonme11t for not having a contractor's liee!ls.~. 
l\Ir. Dremann: "So on that basis you or<>'a n;zed 
• b 
a partnership and took out your eontractor-s li-
cense. 
Referee: "\Vho was it told you that ( 
D. Grossaint: "l\lr. Ilendriekson in the State 
Contractor's Office. 
l\Ir. Dremann: ''Now since the D.O.L. Con-
struetion ceased to operate under the lieense that 
was taken out at the time, you have not had a 
license~ · 
D. Grossai11t: ".No, but I have received some 
papers that if I didn't have one, or get in contact 
with them in 10 days, I was liable for a fine 
and imprisonment, and me and my brother went 
up there and talked to l\Ir. Hendrickson and 
he told us we were not contractors and did not 
need a contractor's license .. , 
The Appellant at all times was aware of the fact 
that the installer, with the truck and the majority of 
the tools, had other installers working with him and 
the Appellant at times paid these other installers di-
rectly. ('l'R-00:28) ( TH-0029). The Appellant knew 
the names of all of the installers whose wages are in 
<1uestion and it is from the Appellant that the auditor ob-
tained his wage breakdown. ( TR-0017). The president 
of Appellant, :\Ir. Pavich, testified for the Appellant. 
(TR-0017): 
"They are engaged, in other words, steel 
applicat ;'.>ll. I would say 80 percent is steel 
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application and the other 20 percent mav be 
window changing. They are all engaged the s'ame, 
other than '~r ayne Case, I think he is a roofer." 
(The record show~ that \V ayne Case advertised him-
self as a roof er under the name of New Style Roofing 
Methods.) One other installer, Lavoy Hardy, Orange-
ville, Utah, appears to have a business of a different 
nature than that involved in his service for Appellant. 
Mrs. Erickson testified for the Appellant. ( TR-0030) : 
"Well, Mr. Hardy has applied siding for us. 
He lives in Orangeville, Utah, but he generally 
does his own selling, his own contracting in that 
area down there. He will sell remodel jobs or 
siding jobs and purchase the material and put 
it on himself, but when we get busy we will call 
him and ask him to come to work for us." (Italics 
ours.) 
In every instance the installer in this case was paid on 
a piece-rate basis. There was no sale of material to any 
installer by the Appellant. ( TR-0031). 
STATE~1ENT OF POINTS 
1. THE INSTALLERS \VERE PERFORM-
ING PERSONAL SERYICES :FOR THE AP-
PELLANT NORTH AMERICAN BUILDERS, 
' 
INC., FOR \V AGES \VITHIN THE MEANING 
OF THE UTAII EMPLOYlVIENT SECURITY 
ACT, CHAPTER 35--:i UCA. 
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2. THE SERVICES OF THE INSTALLERS 
"TERE NOT EXCLUDED FROM THE ACT 
BY REASON OF THE EXCLUSION PROVI-
SIONS OF SECTION 35-4-22 (j) (5) (A) (B) 
AND (C) UCA. 
3. THE INDIVIDUALS REFERRED TO 
IN APPELLANT'S BRIEF AS POINT T\VO 
\VERE PERFORl\IING SERVICES IN EM-
PLOYJVIENT \VITIIIN THE "MEANING OF 
SECTION 35-4-22 (h) (2) UCA. 
4. THE ISSUE OF DESIGNATING A PART 
OF THE PA Yl\ilENT TO THE INSTALLERS 
AS EXPENSES \VAS NEVER RAISED BY 
APPELLANT AT ANY APPEAL STAGE OF 
THIS MATTER AND SHOULD NOT BE CON-
SIDERED BY THE COURT. 
ARGUlWENT 
POINT I 
THE INSTALLERS 'VERE PERFORl\ilING 
PERSONAL SERVICE,S FOR THE APPEL~ 
LANT FOR 'VAGES 'VITHIN THE l\IEAN-
ING OF THE UTAH El\1PLOY1\1ENT SECUR-
ITY ACT CHAPTER 35-4. 
The provisions of the Utah Employment Security 
Act Chapter 35-4< UCA for determinng whether or not 
individuals are performing services "in employment" 
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have been interpreted by this Court in a number of 
unemployment compensation cases. (See Globe Grain 
& Milling Company vs. Industrial Commission and 
Albert Thomas, 98 U. 36, 91 P. 2d 512; Creameries 
of America vs. Industrial Commission and Robert L. 
Foss, 98 U. 577, 102 P. 2d 300; Salt Lake Tribune Pub-
lishing Company vs. Industrial Commission and Lynn 
Clark Cushing, 99 U. 259, 102 P. 2d 307; The Fuller 
Brush Company vs. Industrial Commission and La-
mont Holst, 99 U. 97, 104 P. 2d 201; Singer Sewing 
Machine Company vs. Industrial Commission and 
Gorman C. Winget, 104 U. 175, 134 P. 2d 479; B. 
Grant Powell, also known as B. G. Powell, dba, Royal 
Blaze Coal Company vs. Industrial Commission, 210 
P. 2d 1006; H. L. and Irene Leach, dba, Rusco "lVin-
dow Company vs. Board of Review of Industrial Com-
mission, Department of Employment Security, 123 
U. 423, 260 P. 2d 744.) 
Section 35-4-22 UCA provides as follows: 
" ( h) ( 2) Each individual employed to per-
form or to assist in performing the work of any 
person in the service of an employing unit shall 
be deemed to be engaged by such employing unit 
for all the purposes of this act whether such indi-
vidual was hired or paid directly by such employ-
ing unit or by such person, provided the employ-
ing unit had actual or constructive knowledge 
of the work." 
"(j) ( 1) 'Employment' means any service per-
formed prior to January l, 1941, which was em-
ployment as defined in the Utah unemployment 
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compecisa tion law prior to the effective date of 
this act, and subject to the other provisions of 
this subsection, service performed after Decern_-
ber :-n, 194<0, including senice in interstate com-
merce, and service as an officer of a corporation 
performed for wages or under any contract of 
hire written or oral, express or implied." 
" ( p) 'Wages' means all remuneration for per-
sonal service, including commissions and bonuses 
and the cash value of all remuneration in any 
medium other than cash. Gratuities custornarily 
received by an individual in the course of his 
employment from persons other than his employ-
ing unit shall be treated w; wages received froni 
his employing unit. The reasonable cash value 
of remuneration in any medium other than cash 
and the reasonable amount of gratuities shall be 
estimated and determined in accordance with 
rules prescribed by the Commission; provided, 
that the term 'wages' shall not include: 
" ( 1) For the purpose of Section 35-4-7, that 
part of the remuneration which after remunera-
tion equal to $3,,000 has been paid to an indi-
vidual by an employer with respect to employ-
ment subject to this act during any calendar year 
prior to calendar y~.f'lr 1964 and that part of 
the remuneration which, after remuneration equal 
to $4,200 has been paid to an individual by an 
employer with respect to employment during 
calendar year 1964 and any calendar year there-
after, is paid to such individual by such employer 
during such calendar year; provided, however, 
that for the purposes of this subsection remune-
ration over $4 ,200 shall be deemed to be wages 
subject to contribution to the same extent that 
such remuneration is defined as wages by the 
Federal C nemployment Tax Act as amended." 
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Accordingly, if it is found that the services of individuals 
in question are performed for an employing unit for 
wages, then the services are within the purview of the 
Employment Security Act, unless they are excluded 
by the conjunctive statutory tests of Section 35-4-22 
(j) (5) (A) (B) and (C) which are as follows: 
" ( 5) Services performed by an_ individual for 
wages or under any contract of hire, written or 
oral, express or implied, shall be deemed to be 
employment subject to this act unless and until 
it is shown to the satisfaction of the commission 
that-
" (A) such individual has been and will con-
tinue to be free from control or direction over 
the performance of such services, both under his 
contract of hire and in fact; and 
" ( B) such service is either outside the usual 
course of the business for which such service 
is performed or that such service is performed 
outside of all the places of business of the enter-
prise for which such service is performed; and 
"(C) such individual is customarily engaged 
in an independently established trade, occupa-
tion, profession, or business of the same nature 
as that involved in the contract of service." 
In the Leach case supra, this Court had under con-
sideration the question of whether certain dealers and 
window instaUers performing work under circum-
stances basically similar to those of the salesmen and 
installers in the instant case, were performing services 
"in employment." In the instant case we are concerned 
only with the status of the installers. The facts in the 
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Leach case differ only in that the installers were given 
training by the company. The work was done pursuant 
to the provisions of written contracts and the installers 
usually had full or part time work of a different nature 
than that involved in their contract of service. This 
other work was for other employers. In discussing 
whether the installers were performing services for 
"wages", the Court said in the Leach case supra: 
"There can be no question but what the install-
ers were performing services for the plaintiffs 
for 'wages.' After l.he plaintiffs accepted an order 
they were obligated by contract to furnish and 
install the products. The installers performed a 
service for the plaintiffs which was in fulfillment 
of the plaintiffs' contract with the customer. 
'Vhen the plaintiffs needed someone to install 
windows, they notified one of the installers who 
called at the plaintiffs' place of business and 
obtained the windows and any other necessary 
materials along with a list of specifications. After 
completing the job, he returned a completed 
form to the plaintiffs verifying that the windows 
had been installed and received compensation 
governed by a schedule formulated by the plain-
tiffs." 
In the instant case, each of the installers who 
worked at installing whenever he could find work, 
performed a service for the Appellant which was in 
fulfillment of the Appellant's contract with its customer. 
\Vhen Appellant needed someone to install siding or 
windows or doors, etc., it notified an installer by tele-
phone or so notified the installer at Appellant's office. 
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The installer picked up the "work order" at Appellant's 
office and went in his own truck to Appellant's ware-
house where, assisted by Appellant, he loaded the neces-
sary materials. This usually took about one-half hour.) 
He then trucked the materials to the job location and 
made the installation according to the "work order." 
After the job was completed he returned the completed 
"work order" to the Appellant certifying that the work 
had been done and he was then paid compensation on 
a piece-rate basis which was formulated by the Appel-
lant. 
In the Leach case supra, the Supreme Court said: 
"The service performed by the dealers and 
installers for the plaintiffs is analogous to the 
service found to be rendered for the newspaper 
publishing company by its newspaper carriers 
in the case of Salt Lake Tribune Publishing 
Company vs. Industrial Commission, 99 Utah 
259, 102 P. 2d 307. There the company was 
interested in seeing that its newspaper reached 
its subscribers and in order to accomplish that 
result it entered into a contract wherebv a carrier 
was to perform the service of delivering its news-
papers. Similarly, in Creameries of America, 
Inc. vs. Industrial Commission, supra, we held 
that one Foss, who was a 'franchise dealer' of 
the plaintiff's products was rendering personal 
services for wages for the plaintiff in distributing 
its products to its customers. 
"Having determined then that both the dealers 
and installers performed services for 'wages' for 
the plaintiffs, we must next ascertain whether the 
dealers and the installers are excluded from the 
16 
operation of the Act by the test posed in Section 
35-J-22 (j) (5) (A) (B) and (C)." (The Court 
quoted that section.) 
"It will be noted that the three requirements 
of the test are stated conjunctively and hence all 
three requirements must be met if the services 
rendered for the plaintiffs are to be excluded 
from the Act." 
POINT II 
THE SERVICES OF THE "INSTALLERS" 
ARE NOT EXCLUDED UNDER THE (A) (B) 
AND (C) PROVISIONS OF SECTION 35-4-22 
(j) (5). 
A. SUCH INDIVIDUALS \VERE NOT 
FREE .FRO~I DIRECTION OR CONTROL 
OVER THE PERFORMANCE OF SUCH 
SERVICES. 
In the case of Salt Lake Tribune Publishing Com-
pany vs. Industrial Commission, supra, this Court in 
discussing the element of control said: 
"While there is also some evidence in the 
record to the effect that the company had no 
right to, and did not in fact exercise any 'control 
or direction over the performance' of the services 
performed by Cushing, still the evidence set out 
above is ample to support the finding of the 
Commission that 'the claimant in this case was 
not free from direction and control over the per-
formance of services rendered under his con-
tract.' Al all events the evidence is such that we 
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cannot say that the Commission must, as reason-
able men, have found that claimant was free from 
such control.'~ 
The Appellant employed installers who were skilled 
in their trade and kne"v much more about the details 
of their work than did the management employees of 
the Appellant. The Appellant had no supervisory em-
ployees at the installations. There was an almost com-
plete reliance on the installt:fr to perform to the speci-
fications of the "work order" to the satisfaction of 
the home owner. The installers were well aware that 
to maintain a continuing relationship with the Appellant 
their work must be well done. Otherwise they would 
be given no further "work orders." The Appellant, by 
withholding "work orders" could easily and effectively 
terminate the relationship with the installer. 
An employer hiring a skilled craftsman from a 
union hall would have little or no reason to supervise 
his actual performance but he would have every right 
to direct him. While the Appellant did not supervise 
the actual installation, the president of Appellant did 
have immediate supervision over the loading and un-
loading of materials at the Appellant's warehouse. 
The "work orders" themselves were a form of 
direction and control and the Appellant had every right 
to see that the performance was done according to its 
orders. The installers were not required to be on a 
job at a particular hour but they were working for 
a living and being paid their wages on a piece-rate basis 
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so they di<l the work promptly. If they had failed to per-
form according to the "work order" and to perform 
promptly, the Appellant had every right to termina~e 
the relationship by taking the "work order" away from 
them. 
This has become a nation of highly-skilled special-
ists. An employer or supervisor can offer little advice 
or instruction to a fully trained person at the actual 
performance of his work. The role of the employer in 
such cases is generally, in relation to the skilled worker, 
to make the work assignment, check the quality of the 
result, and control the relations and actions of such 
worker and his fellow workers. There can be little 
doubt that the Appellant had the right to remove an 
installer from the job at the home of the customer if 
the customer demanded it on the grounds that the 
installer was intoxicated or otherwise objectionable. 
It must be kept in mind that under the instant 
situation, particular individuals were engaged by the 
Appellant because they had the required skills and they 
were engaged to perform their services personally. 
In the case of Creameries of America, Inc. vs. 
Industrial Commission, supra, the Court discussed the 
meaning of personal services as follows: 
"Section 19 ( p) defines 'wages' as 'all remu-
neration payable for personal services, including 
commissions and bonuses and the case value of 
all remuneration payable in any medium other 
than c<ish.' The terms 'services' and 'personal 
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service' used in defining 'wages' are not speci-
fically defined in the Act. In ordinary usage the 
term 'services' has a rather broad and general 
meaning. l t includes generally any act performed 
for the benefit of another under some arrange-
ment or agreement whereby such act was to have 
been performed. The general definition of 'serv-
ice' as given in 'Vebster's New International 
Dictionary is 'performance of labor for the bene-
fit of another'; 'L'lct or instance of helping, or 
benefiting.' The term 'personal service' indicates 
that the 'act' done for the benefit of another is 
done personally by a particular individual. 
"Where under \V orkmen' s Compensation Acts 
the term 'service' was used in defining an em-
ployee the courts have held that the word implies 
a submission to the will of another as to direction 
and control, ( Missisippi Theatre Corp. v. Hal-
liesburg Local Union, 174 lYiiss. 439, 164 So. 
887) ; or indicates a master-servant relationship 
(Rutherford vs. Tobin, 336 Mo. 1171, 82 S.,V. 
(2d) 918). But in all cases the intention of the 
legislature as to the meaning of the term in the 
particular act governs (Rutherford v. Tobin, 
supra). And in some acts both 'employee' and 
'independent contractor' are defined in terms of 
service. Under the California Act an independent 
contractor is defined as one 'who renders service, 
other than manual labor, for a specified recom-
pense for a specified result, under the control 
of his principal as to the result of his work only 
and not as to the means bv which such result is 
accomplished.' (Italics added.) See Fidelity & 
Casualtv Co. YS. Industrial Accident Comm., 
191 Cal. 404, 216 P. 578." 
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The Commission and referee properly found that 
the installers were not excluded from coverage of the 
Act under the "A test." 
B. THE SERVICE \VAS PERFORMED IN 
THE USUAL COURSE OF THE EMPLOY-
ER'S BUSINESS AND PART OF THE SERV-
ICE WAS PERFORMED IN THE EMPLOY-
ER'S PLACE OF BUSINESS. 
The contract with the home owner, which is nego-
tiated by the Appellant through its agent, the salesman, 
provides that for a certain sum of money the Appellant 
will provide the necessary materials, deliver them to 
the home and install them in a satisfactory manner. 
This was the employer's usual course of business. 
The Appellant's work order and its arrangement 
with the installer required the installer, as a part of his 
performance, to bring his own truck to the Appellant's 
warehouse where, under direction of the Appellant, 
he performed the task of loading the necessary materials 
for the job. This loading work, usually taking about 
one-half hour per home installation, was performed at 
the place of business of the Appellant, and was an 
integral part of the work to be performed. In no sense 
could it be classified as negligible or as incident to 
anything other than the employer's usual course of 
operation. In addition, the installer was required to 
return any unused materials to the warehouse and per-
form the job of unloading those materials. All of the 
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work was done in the usual course of the Appellant's 
business. This was not a case where a customer might 
come to the place of business and purchase materials 
such as is described by counsel in his brief. In the 
instant case, there is no such buyer-seller relationship. 
Were this a situation where the employer, in the usual 
course of his business, delivered the materials to the job 
site by means other than using the installer's truck and 
the installer only occasionally picked up a needed or 
forgotten article, the situation might be viewed in a 
different light. But this case is not of that nature. The 
Appellant did not deliver materials other than through 
his employee, the installer, and the work of loading 
them was significant and as much a part of his overall 
job as the actual installation. The piece-rate payments 
which were made to him included compensation for his 
time spent in loading and hauling the materials to the 
site of the work and he was expected to do this loading 
and hauling personally. This was the nature of his 
contract of hire. 
C. IT 'VAS NOT SHO,VN TO THE SATIS-
FACTION OF THE COl\!IMISSION THAT 
THE INSTALLERS 'VERE CUSTOMARILY 
ENGAGED IN INDIVIDUALLY ESTAB-
LISHED TRADES, OCCUPATIONS, PROFES-
SIONS OR BUSINESSES OF THE SAME 
NATURE AS TIIAT INVOLVED IN THE 
CONTRACT OF SERVICE. 
22 
In the case of Leach vs. Board of Review, supra, 
the Court discussed those elements to be considered in 
determining whether or not the dealers and installers 
were "customarily engaged in an independently estab-
lished trade, etc.,'' the Court said: 
"Assuming for the purposes of this decision 
that the evidence compels a finding that the deal-
ers and installers met the requirements of both 
(A) and ( B ) , there is evidence in the record 
from which the Board of Review could have 
reasonably concluded that requirement ( C) was 
not met, i.e. that neither the dealers nor the in-
stailers wtre 'customarily engaged in an inde-
pendently established trade, occupation, profes-
sion or business of the same nature as that in-
volved in the contract of service.' In Fuller 
Brush Co. v. Ind. Comm., supra, we pointed out 
that a shoe shiner, an auto mechanic, a plumber 
and a barber meet this requirement because the 
services which they perform emanate as a part 
of a business in which they are engaged. They 
perform services for others while in the pursuit 
of a business independently established and in 
which they are customarily engaged and for 
which service, like a common carrier, they hold 
themselves out to perform. The plaintiffs urge 
that each dealer was customarily engaged in the 
independently established business of salesman-
ship. This contention is untenable. Requirement 
( C) contemplates that the service rendered is a 
part of, and is rendered in pursuance of, a busi-
ness of the person rendering the service, inde-
pendently established, in which that person is 
customarily engaged. In other words, the 'inde-
pendently established business' must exist inde-
pendent of the services under consideration in 
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the sense that it is the whole-of which the par. 
ticular service is a part. In Fuller Brush Co. \'. 
Ind. Comm., supra, it was stated: 
'Plaintiff contends that the provision [re· 
quiremeut C} refers wholly to the service in· 
valved, and argues that if m rendering sud 
service, claimant was acting for himself ht 
was engaged in a business of his own, ana 
therefore during such employment was cus-
tomarily engaged in an independently estab-
lished business. The difficulty with this posi· 
tion is that it ignores entirely the significance 
of the words "customarily" and "independent-
ly." The statute does not say, as the Colorado 
court read it in Industrial Comm. v. North-
western .Mutual Life Ins. Co., 103 Colo. 550, 
88 P. 2d 560, "independently engaged in an 
established business." The adverb "independ-
ently" clearly modifies the word "establishes," 
and must therefore carry the meaning that the 
"busines!; ' or "trade" was established inde-
pendently of the employer or the rendering 
of the personal service forming the basis of 
the claim. And in the exclusion clauses (ii 
( 5) , or perhaps more correctly the clauses 
making the exception from the general inclu-
sion of all persons rendering personal services 
for wages, the present tense "is" indicates the 
employee must be engaged in such independent 
business at the time of rendering the service 
involved. "Customarily" means usually, habitu-
ally, according to the customs, general prac· 
tice or usual order of things, regularly.' 
"Uv their agreements with the plaintiffs, deal· 
ers w~re not allowed to sell products not ~arried 
b)' the plaintiffs, although there was testimony 
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that some dealers did not in fact abide by this 
restriction. However, it is not enough that the 
dealers may have other sources of income. ln 
selling such other products the dealers were not 
pursuing an independently established business, 
but rather working under contract of employ-
ment with other parties. The dealers paid nothing 
for their franchises or dealerships. They were 
prohibited by their agreements with the plain-
tiffs from assigning their franchises to anyone 
else. The risk of profit and loss was all in the 
plaintiffs. Selling for the plaintiffs was the only 
or at least the main business of the dealers, if 
indeed it can be called a business. They had 
nothing aside from their relationship with the 
plaintiffs. 'Vhen the services of a dealer were 
terminated by the plaintiffs, he became unem-
ployed and had to secure employment elsewhere. 
He had no business of his own to fall back on 
- a business established independently of his 
relationship with the plaintiffs and from which 
his services for the plaintiffs emanate, a business 
in which he was customarily engaged aside from 
his relationship with the plaintiffs. The dealers' 
occupation was selling, but they had no inde-
pendently established business as do brokers or 
commission merchants. None of the dealers held 
themselves out to the public as operating a sales 
" agency. 
The Court then quoted from its holdings in the 
Globe Grain and Milling Company vs. Industrial Com-
mission supra and Creameries of America vs. Indus-
' ' 
trial Commission, supra. The Court then continued: 
"'Vhat we have said in regard to the dealers 
applies equally as well to the installers. Their 
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situation differs from the dealers only in tha\ C( 
a small fraction of their time was consumed in tc 
rendering service for the plaintiffs whereas the 
dealers spent almost all, if not all, their working v. 
time performing services for the plaintiffs. How I'' 
ever, this difference does not strengthen their 
case insofar as meeting requirement ( C). The 
evidence reveals that two of the installers were t 
regularly employed by the Kennecott Copper c 
Company, one by the United States Smelting 
& Refining Company, one was a salesman, ano 
another's occupation was unknown. It is readil) 
apparent that because the installers were so em 
ployed, their services which they rendered for the ~ 
plaintiffs did not emanate from any independ· 
ently established business in which they were 
customarily engaged. To the contrary, they were 
customarily engaged in employment elsewhere 
for other employers. None of them were licensed 
contractors or self-employed carpenters or crafts· 
" men. 
In the instant case the installers, when not em 
ployed by Appellant, had to find employment with other 
employers in the installation industry. They differ from 
those in the Leach case in that their other employment 
was of the same nature as that involved in their work for 
Appellant. In the Leach case most of the installen 
had jobs of a different nature than installing. 
The skilled carpenter who is a member of the union 
is in a similar position. 'Vhen he finishes a job for au 
employer, he must find other carpenter work. Instead 
of contacting a prospective employer directly, he reg· 
isters at the union hall and when an employer order 
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1at comes iu and he is next on the hiring list, he is referred 
lli to the job. If the carpenter has a job with an employer 
l1t 
which covers a long period of time he doesn't have to 1g 
,v. register at the hiring hall. 
~If 
11 
The claimants Grossaint spent the majority of their 
re time working for Appellant and on most days when not 
~r out on a job they were at Appellant's office waiting 
ig for "work orders." 0. Grossaint testified that during 
1d 
I) 1967 he worked for Appellant steadily except for one 
1. job which he did for Utah-Idaho Roofing and Siding 
1t Company. His two sons worked with him most of the 
j. time. ( TR-0040) . 
The Appellant offered only scanty testimony about 
the other installers which were included in the assess-
ment. \Ve do not know whether or not such other instal-
lers worked more or less full time with other employers. 
From the testimony it is reasonable to conclude 
that the installers were engaged throughout the indus-
1 try on a "piece-rate" basis and that in no case was a 
profit and loss situation present. None of the installers 
has business cards, business telephones, places of busi-
ness, or classified advertising which would hold them 
out to the public as installers. A few, including Gros-
saint, have licenses. The Grossaints testified (TR-0048) 
(TR-00.53) that they were informed by the "State Con-
tractors Board" that they were not contractors and did 
not need contractor's licenses. 
They were customarily engaged when not working 
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for the Appellant by other employers for piece-rat 
wages which were fixed by the employer in the industr) 
They were required to furnish their own tools and tr 
perform the services which the Appellant, in its contraC' 
with the home owner, had contracted to perform. Thi 
installers performed in the course of business of th1 
Appellant-they had no agreement whatever with th1 
home owner. They operated on "work orders" givet 
them by Appellant and if their work was not satis· 
factory the Appellant had the right to tell them hr 
make changes and the employer could ref use in tht 
future to give them any "work orders." It appears frorn 
the testimony that there are only a few concerns lefl 
in the metal siding business. 
Eldon R. Mecham testified that he performed in 
the same manner as the Grossaints. (TR-0058). He 
was a member of the carpenters' union but he did car· 
penter work only for the Appellant. When he worked 
with someone else the two of them split the money "right 
down the middle." ( TR-0059). The other installers by 
trade were carpenters, roofers, stone masons, plasterers, 
etc. For example, Mrs. Erickson stated, in testifying 
for Appellant, about Andy Lee, an installer: 
"He came to work for us. He came to work 
primarily to put-ston~ o.n. lie is .a stol1;~ mas,on. 
I think, as well as a s1dmg applicator. ('IR 
0029). 
She testified about Gary Cockran: 
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-rat, "Oh, he did a clean-up job I think once and 
str1 I dealt with him directly but otherwise he-a11d 
d tr only through Brent Cropper." ( TR-0030). 
Tac' She testified: 
Thi 
th1 
th1 
I Vet 
"Lee Brown does plastering work and that 
type of thing - he has often worked for l\ir. 
Smith, ·who is our Kenetex applicator." (TR-
0031). 
a tis· 
The testimony of the Appellant's witnesses con-
1 hi 
tht tains little to show that the several tradesmen working 
for Appellant were customarily engaged in independ-
rorn 
lefl ently established trades, occupations, professions, or 
l in 
He 
car· 
businesses. The Commission and the Referee properly 
found that they were not so established. 
POINT III 
THE INDIVIDUALS REFERRED TO IN 
ight APPELLANT'S BRIEF AS POINT II 'VERE 
: by PERFORMING SERVICES IN EMPLOY-
MENT 'VITHIN THE MEANING OF SEC-
TION 35-4-22 (h) (2) UCA: 
ked 
·ers, 
ork 
;on. 
~R 
" ( 2) Each individual employed to perform or 
to assist in performing the work of any person 
in the service of an employing unit shall be 
deemed to be engaged by such employing unit 
for all the purposes of this act whether such 
individual was hired or paid directly by such 
employing unit or by such person, provided the 
employing unit had actual or constructive knowl-
edge ~f the work." 
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The individuals named in Appellant's Point II 
were engaged with the full and complete knowledge 01 
Appellant to assist in the performance of the installa. 
tion work. This becomes perfectly obvious since the 
information used in making the detailed audit contain. 
ing the names of all individuals performing service~ 
was obtained from the Appellant's records. All of the 
installers, the principals and the helpers, came and wen! 
from the Appellant's office and from the Appellant'~ 
warehouse. Referring to several of the individuals listed 
in Point II we find that; C. Gonsowsky was actually 
hired by a salesman who was an agent of the Appellant 
and Gonsowsky, therefore, was in fact hired by Appel· 
lant; Thomas Jones worked with his son, Robert, and 
constituted another father and son team. The Appel· 
lant of course was aware of the fact that installing siding 
was generally not just a one-man job. 
Grossaint testified ( TR-0044) : 
" ... Lynn Bell . . . worked with us, not for 
" us. 
In practice, payments at times were made to the 
lead installer and were then split down the middle witl1 
the other installer or installers and at times paymenti 
were made to each of the installers. 
'Vithin the Section 22 (j) ( 5) (A) ( B), and (Cl. 
supra, and the above quoted Section 22 (h) (2), all 
of the individuals engaged to work with installers were 
performing services for Appellant for wages. 
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II POINT IV 
OJ THE ISSUE OF DESIGNATING A PART 
Ila. OF THE PAYl\iIENT TO INSTALLERS AS 
the EXPENSES WAS NEVER RAISED BY AP-
,in. PELLANT AT ANY APPEAL STAGE AND 
ce~ SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED BY THE 
the COURT. 
en! 
1 t'~ At no time prior to the filing of Appellant's brief 
ted was the issue of designating a portion of the payments 
.l!y to the installers as expenses even referred to by Appel-
rnt lant. In fact, the amount of the assessment was never 
1e]. really in question. We are unable to determine whether 
.nd the Appellant did or did not keep records of the ex-
iel· penses of its installers. If a record was kept, it seems 
ng quite clear that the Department auditor would have 
for 
taken such expenses into consideration. Neither of the 
Appellant' st witnesses offered any testimony in the 
hearing before the Appeals Referee to the effect that 
expenses should be deducted nor did they take any 
action before the Commission representative which 
resulted in a review decision which was being appealed 
he to the Referee. In its appeal to the Board of Review, 
ith the Appellant said nothing of any claim that the assess-
1ti ment was too high. An examination of the record before 
~). 
all 
~re 
the Appeals Referee ( TR-0060) shows the following 
exchange: 
"Referee: If von have nothing further-you 
will get the info~mation relative to the accuracy 
of figures inYolved in the audit, )fr. N emelka? 
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"Mr. N emelka: Yes I will, the first .Monda: co1 
or Tuesday." , ba: 
The question of the Referee and the answer of counst AJ 
were occasioned by an"off the record" discussion as tr Ill! 
whether the wages in the assessment were accurate!! pe: 
listed. The record does not reveal that information wa Ac 
filed by Appellant indicating that the assessment wa 
incorrect and the issue is raised for the first time b: 
Appellant in its brief. 
The Appellant was charged with the duty of keep 
ing records in such a manner that would show that' 
certain part of the payments were for expenses and othe1 
parts were for wages. If there was a record kept o: 
expenses, the auditor made the proper allowance. Ht 
made the proper allowance, that is, if the employer'· 
records contained documentation of any expenses listei 
therein. 
Appellant's contention in Point II should be di1 
missed as being without merit. 
CONCLUSIONS 
We submit that the installers are within the pur-
view of the Utah Employment Security Act as inter 
preted by previous decisions of this Court and, there 
fore, were performing services in employment withi1 
the meaning of the Act. "\Ve further submit, therefon 
that those installers who filed claims for unemploymen' 
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nda: compensation benefits are entitled to benefits on the 
LlllSt 
as tr 
atel1 
basis of the ''wages" paid to those installers by the 
Appellant. The Re.spondents, therefore, pray that find-
ings of the said Respondents that the installers were 
performing services in employment as defined by the 
wa Act be affirmed. 
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